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Introduction
Cognitive Narrative Studies: Themes and Variations
lars bernaerts, dirk de geest,
luc herman, and bart vervaeck

The present collection of essays offers a sample of cutting-edge research
in the field of cognitive narrative studies. The workings and effects of literary narratives provide the main focus, but the collection also reflects
upon the relations between hermeneutic and empirical tendencies as they
increasingly affect the study of cognition and narrative. In particular, the
chapters in this volume will show how speculative research on readers’
positions can supplement empirical inquiries. In the remainder of our
introduction, we first summarize some of the trends in the cognitive study
of literature against the background of literary theory. We start off with a
phenomenon that has been thoroughly examined in literary theory and
that is approached with new tools in several of the chapters in this volume: the gappy nature of literary narratives. At the end of our introduction, we provide a synopsis of the separate chapters.
Minds, Narrative, and the Pursuit of Gappiness
One of the sections in B. S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates (1969), a book
published in the form of twenty-seven unbound chapters in a box, starts
with a reflection on narrativization and style. How will the narrator, who
is a sports journalist, report on the local soccer derby? He considers using
the bald spots on the field as a metaphor in his article: “The pitch worn,
the worn patches, like
There might be an image, there, if I can
think of one, at this stage of the season, it might too stand for what these
two teams are like, are doing.
If I can think of one” (Johnson 1969,
1). While the character-narrator is thinking about these worn patches,
they already materialize in front of the reader’s eyes. The bald spots in
Johnson’s text echo the narrator’s thoughts as well as the narrator’s thinking. His mind and his narrative are full of gaps and sudden shifts, and
1
Buy the Book

therefore the text is gappy. The fact that the chapters of the novel are loose
and presented in a book-shaped box reinforces this idea and further transposes it into the reader’s experience. As the author explains himself (in a
bbc documentary broadcast in 1969), the physical and typographical presentation of the text is a metaphor for the mind of the narrating protagonist. In addition, it is a metaphor for the mind of the reader. Albert Angelo
(1964), another novel written by Johnson, demonstrates that gaps in a
narrative text not only require an additional effort of the reader but also
enable him or her to see something else and to make new narrative connections. The holes cut in the pages (1964, 149–52) of Albert Angelo function as windows on the further course of the narrative.
Far from being mere places of emptiness, void of significance, gaps like
the ones Johnson foregrounds in his texts provide access to some of the
key concerns of this volume. In particular, as we discuss in what follows,
there are various kinds and levels of narrative gaps discussed in narrative
theory. By going into these theoretical constructs, we can show some of
the constants appearing in cognitive approaches to narrative, and in this
book in particular.
Minding the Gap
Bridging gaps and filling holes is what readers do all the time when they
are comprehending or interpreting narratives. In literary theory, this process of gap-filling is widely recognized and linked to the reader’s cognitive
efforts. From Gérard Genette’s paralipsis to Meir Sternberg’s informational gaps, from Wolfgang Iser’s Leerstellen to Lubomir Doležel’s and David
Herman’s deliberations on gaps and action representations, the idea of
narrative lacunae has been prominent in theories of the narrative.1 The
reader mobilizes his or her knowledge and experience to supplement what
is left unsaid. More particularly, models of fictional minds such as Alan
Palmer’s stress the importance of gap-filling activities undertaken both
by fictional characters and by real readers.
A similar line of reasoning can be found in the philosophy of mind
(which has, in fact, inspired narrative scholars like Palmer), in cognitive
science, and in neurological approaches to literature and art. Daniel Dennett’s and Galen Strawson’s views on consciousness, as taken up by Palmer (2009, 292–93) in his model of fictional minds, chime with the notion
of lacunae-driven narrativization. In Consciousness Explained, Dennett
2
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stresses the “gappy and sparse” (1991, 366) nature of consciousness, on the
one hand, and the narrative constitution of the self, on the other hand.
The self is no more than “the center of narrative gravity”; our minds and
selves are the “product [of narratives], not their source” (418).
On yet another level of minds and narrative, there is an “explanatory
gap” (Herman 2009, 146) between qualia, or the felt experience of subjective awareness, and neurophysiological descriptions of mental functioning. Up to now, the neurological repertoire—offering explanations in
terms of neurons, synapses, and electrochemical transactions—remains
partly unsatisfactory in accounting for the ways in which we experience
the world through our consciousness. Because of its fragmented narrative
structure, B. S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates can impose a feeling of disorientation on the reader. While this feeling is meaningful in the reader’s
subjective experience, it might be insignificant or even barely distinguishable in a neurological description of that reader’s brain. Although they
both theorize the mind, there is still quite a gap between phenomenological (subjective) and neurological (objective) inquiries. To give one more
example, Ellen Spolsky’s Gaps in Nature (1993) characterizes the activity
of compensating for lacunae as inherent not just in literary interpretation and literary historiography but also in the modular processing that
goes on in our brains. It is not the smooth cooperation of modules (e.g.,
the senses) that generates new meanings, but the gaps and seams between
them: “They are the sites of innovations resulting from the incommensurability between modules” (1993, 31).
Although there are significant differences as to the level and function
of the “gaps” in these theories, they arise from a shared interest in minds
and narrative, or what Herman (2009) terms the “nexus of narrative and
mind” (137–60). The dynamics and interpretation of narratives depend
on the absence of information and on discrepancies between the reader’s
knowledge and the knowledge possessed by narrators and characters.
As narrative theory teaches us, narratives come into being through the
interaction between minds and narrative gaps. In brief, there is a profound awareness among theorists of mind as well as theorists of narrative
that the construction and interpretation of narratives as coherent wholes
paradoxically require gaps, empty spaces, and hidden information. The
inquiry into minds and narrative has often taken the shape of pinpointing these gaps and describing how we fill them. In what follows we first
Introduction
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offer a thumbnail history of some of these approaches to narrative gaps.
In that way, some of the theoretical affiliations connecting the history of
literary theory to the current cognitive approaches will become apparent.
Against that background, we will then focus on the novelties associated
with cognitive approaches in particular.
Traditions in Narrative and Cognition
Narrative theorists have always shown interest in the relation between
minds and narrative. But though this continuity is striking, there are some
noticeable shifts in method and actual focus—shifts that, again, the issue
of narrative gaps can help throw into relief. To clarify both continuity
and shifts, we will simplify matters and present the evolution of thinking
about minds and texts in three steps: the hermeneutic phase associated
with phenomenology (largely preceding narratology), the structuralist
stage of classical narratology, and the cognitive, postclassical approach.
Generally speaking, the hermeneutic tradition tries to integrate the
objective, philological dimension of the text and the subjective processing of the text. In Schleiermacher’s (1998, 9–18) terminology, the grammatical and psychological aspects must merge into one. This presupposes
an endless back-and-forth movement between the “actual” text and the
reader’s interpretation of it. In this movement—which takes the form of
the famous hermeneutic circle—the text becomes ever more meaningful
and the reader continually learns more and more. Ideally, this would lead
to a “complete” interpretation, but in practice there is always something
left to be interpreted—a gap.
The tradition of hermeneutics and, more broadly, of phenomenology
offers an explanation for these gaps. Thus, Roman Ingarden stresses that
every interpretation or “concretization” (1973, 162) centers around “spots
of indeterminacy” (246 ff.) that can never be fully determined as the literary text itself is necessarily indeterminate on all levels, for example, on
the level of spatiotemporal representations and descriptions. In a novel
such as B. S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates these indeterminacies are foregrounded typographically and thematically, but they are an integral part
of each work of fiction and every act of reading. The evocation of a story can never be exhaustive, and a quasi-exhaustive account of a fictional
world would probably be unreadable. The excess of information would
kill the story.
4
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Before the emergence of narratology and cognitive theory, Ingarden’s
discussion of the textual organization and the readerly filling out of blanks
already deals with issues taken up by recent cognitive approaches. HansGeorg Gadamer, another key figure in the hermeneutic tradition, uses the
term “horizon” to frame the meeting between the mind of the reader and
the demands of the text. As it is part of a larger textual and cultural tradition, the text “expects” a certain knowledge of its reader, who, in his or
her turn, comes to the text with his or her own tradition and prejudices.
Interpretation is the complex meeting point of the textual horizon with
the readerly horizon. A good interpretation is the result of a “fusion of
horizons” (1979, 306) that implies a “self-forgetfulness” (122) and aims at
a specific truth. Such a complete fusion and forgetfulness is presented as
an ideal. In many interpretations, this ideal is never attained.
The idea of horizons meeting and, especially, clashing is omnipresent in
the reception theory of Hans-Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser. They tend
to contest the hermeneutic belief in a perfect interpretation and integration. Their interest lies less in situating literary works in a tradition than
in identifying the mechanisms that underlie literary dynamics. To them,
openness and conflict define the literary quality of a text, and therefore
literature is incompatible with a perfect fusion of horizons or a complete
filling in of blanks. Jauss (1970, 187) takes Gadamer to task for the latter’s
belief in a final reconciliation of minds and texts. As an alternative, Jauss
defines literature in terms of the “aesthetic distance” between the horizons of the reader and the text. This distance is never bridged in literary
works of art.
As Jauss corrects Gadamer, so Iser (1978, 274 ff.) corrects Ingarden. The
gaps—or Leerstellen in Iser’s terminology—can be filled in many ways
(there is not one final and correct reading) and, indeed, will always remain
open to some extent: “one text is potentially capable of several different
realizations, and no reading can ever exhaust the full potential, for each
individual reader will fill in the gaps in his own way, thereby excluding
the various other possibilities; as he reads, he will make his own decision
as to how the gap is to be filled. In this very act the dynamics of reading
are revealed” (Iser 1972, 285). In its material presentation The Unfortunates underlines this fact: individual readers are invited to freely choose
the order in which they read the chapters, thereby creating new gaps and
filling them in very different ways. As the order of the chapters changes,
Introduction
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readers will interpret the events and the narrator’s memories differently.
The idea of “different realizations” becomes very palpable in the case of
Johnson’s novel.
Not unlike cognitive studies, Iser’s reception theory offers a model
for the understanding of the reader’s mental response. That is why his
ideas are often integrated in that context. Iser’s approach, however, operates on a more abstract level of theorization than the cognitive approach.
Instead of dealing with concrete cognitive processes or empirical readers,
he adopts a broad phenomenological view—this is the term he himself
(1978, 274) uses—on the reader’s experience. The same goes for the other
hermeneutic and phenomenological thinkers we mentioned: they introduce an idealized and abstract reader, not going into concrete cognitive
processes involved in the idealized process of minds meeting narratives.
Structuralist and formalist theories tend to ignore subjectivity and
instead emphasize the distribution and structure of textual gaps. For his
part, Gérard Genette uses the term “paralipsis” to indicate information
that is needed but absent in the narration (1980, 194). His classification is
concerned with the surface structure of narrative texts, rather than a deep
structure situated in the human mind. Similarly, when the French structuralists A. J. Greimas and J. Courtès examine “The Cognitive Dimension
of Narrative Discourse” (1976), they are dealing with gaps in the distribution of knowledge. They suggest, for example, that “a gap or disjunction is produced between the acting subject (the subject of doing) and the
knowing subject (the cognitive subject), a gap the sudden destruction of
which can constitute an event of a different order, a cognitive event with
repercussions and peripeteias” (1976, 439). For Greimas and Courtès, a
cognitive imbalance exists on several levels, between characters as well
as between the reader and the text.
There is, in formalist and structuralist thought, an undercurrent of
thinking about narrative and literature in terms of minds. Structuralism is
obviously built on linguistic foundations and textual features, but the universal underlying systems it discriminates are situated in the human mind.
In Culler’s seminal study on structuralism, Structuralist Poetics (1975), this
becomes particularly clear when he discusses literary competence, convention, and naturalization. Culler’s notion of “naturalization” stems from
the Russian formalists’ concept of “motivation” and the structuralist idea
of “vraisemblablisation” (Culler 1975, 161). Readers tend to recuperate tex6
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tual material by placing it in a “discursive order” that is already familiar
to them. The style and structure of The Unfortunates, for example, might
strike us as unconventional and odd at first. However, if we consider the
text as a mimetic and verbalized evocation of the narrator’s thought processes, we can easily naturalize the textual fragmentation. Another mechanism already involved here is that of “literary competence”: readers can
use literary frames of reference to make sense of Johnson’s novel and read
it as “experimental fiction.” More recently, the concept of “naturalization”
has been expanded and revised in Monika Fludernik’s “natural” narratology (1996) and revitalized in schema-theoretical approaches to narrative
texts. Likewise, David Herman systematically does justice to the structuralist tradition when he recalibrates narratological concepts (Herman 2002).
“Motivation” is not the only formalist or structuralist term adumbrating the current cognitive models of minds and narrative. Shklovsky’s concept of defamiliarization (“ostranenie”) and Mukařovský’s foregrounding
(“aktualisace”) also entail hypotheses about the reader’s mental functioning. The reader’s perception of reality is presumed to be affected by the
reading of literary texts. In the empirical study of literature, these explicit
and implicit claims about the reader’s mind have been tested. Willie van
Peer’s Stylistics and Psychology (1986) is a classic example, on which a number of other scholars have built (see Miall 2006, 112–13). Focusing on foregrounding, van Peer’s study provides empirical data for literary-theoretical
hypotheses developed by Mukařovský. In that way, the empirical study
of literature tackles the problem of the reader’s position—a problem that
remains tacit in structuralist approaches. As Marisa Bortolussi and Peter
Dixon indicate, structuralism seems to approach readers as “universal,
aggregate, hypothetical entities responding in unison” (2003, 6), whereas empirical studies factor in the (individual) responses of real readers.
Instead of divining the reader’s response to The Unfortunates, we could
set up an experiment. We can, for example, empirically test whether the
reader’s image of the characters is affected by the order in which he or she
reads the chapters. One group of readers can be asked to read the chapters in a certain order, and their reading experiences (documented on the
basis of a questionnaire) can be compared with those of another group.
Another prominent model of narrative gaps is developed in Meir
Sternberg’s Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction (1978).
According to Sternberg, the dynamics of reading arise from the informaIntroduction
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tional gaps between the represented time and the communicative time. In
The Unfortunates, the particular succession of these gaps—which, in turn,
lead to surprise/suspense/curiosity—depends on the order in which the
reader processes the text. For example, information about the narrator’s
relationship with his passed-away friend can be announced but withheld
in one chapter and then disclosed in the next one. If the latter chapter is
read first, then the effect might be “surprise” rather than “curiosity.”
For their part, more recent cognitive approaches2 to narrative systematically relate such textual patterns to the workings of a human mind keyed to
information processing. For the sake of clarity, we can distinguish between
the terms “cognitive” and “cognitivist” here. The former is a generic term
used for a broad variety of approaches directly affected by the cognitive
turn, ranging from cognitive narratology to evolutionary, neurological,
and empirical studies of literature. “Cognitivist” is the term we use in a
strict sense for those forms of inquiry that focus not on the reader’s subjective experience but on the mental operations required to comprehend
narratives. The main goal is to describe these cognitive responses (e.g., the
activation of memory patterns). While phenomenology deals with minds
and narrative in intentionalist terms and neurology in biological, materialist terms (cf. Hogan 2003, 31), cognitivist research often hovers between
those two poles. When we use the term “empirical,” we draw attention to
a particular method in the examination of readers’ minds.
Moving beyond structuralist emphases on the grammar of gapping,
cognitivist, empirical, and neuropsychological views on narrative sensemaking situate the gap-filling process in both the brain (the computer) and the mind (the software). Simplifying these positions, we can say
that the cognitivist reading ends when the mental processes have been
described, whereas the structuralist reading ends when the rules that govern the narrative have been reconstructed. Meanwhile, more traditionally
hermeneutic approaches address empty spaces in a particular narrative
by following the hermeneutic circle. In that sense, the hermeneutic reading never ends, since the hermeneutic circle entails an endless feedback
loop between the content of the narrative and the consciousness of the
interpreter.
Empirical studies of literature may focus on surface phenomena such
as eye movements and speed of reading, but they may also try to explain
these behavioral phenomena in terms of mental patterns behind them. In
8
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their empirical approach to aspects of the narrative, for example, Marisa
Bortolussi and Peter Dixon (2003) pay particular attention to the way textual cues are processed by readers on the basis of their convictions and
prior knowledge. In sum, the way minds and narrative are conceptualized depends on the research object the researcher has in mind: the deep
structure of the narrative for structuralism, the cognitive processes that
make up narrative comprehension for cognitivist studies, the concrete
text as a whole for hermeneutics, or the patterns of the reader’s behavior
for the empirical study of literature.
Narrative Studies and Cognitive Theory
The cognitive turn has reinforced the empirical basis of narrative studies
and strengthened the connection with other disciplines (such as artificial intelligence, discursive psychology, evolutionary biology, philosophy
of mind, cognitive linguistics, neuroscience, etc.). Whereas the first wave
of cognitive approaches to narrative mainly imported insights from the
cognitive sciences, the second wave has displayed a stronger awareness
of the unique qualities of (literary) narratives and their potential value
for cognitive research. In other words, second-wave cognitive narrative
studies can see more clearly how the study of narratives can enrich theories of the mind.
We can find several versions of this development in cognitive literary
studies. Mark Turner situates the roots of typical human mental functioning in “literary” processes. The way we think is based on literary, narrative
devices such as “metaphor,” “story,” and “parable” (Turner 1996). In her
accounts of sociocognitive complexity in literature, Lisa Zunshine (2006)
suggests that levels of intentionality can be multiplied in narrative fiction,
so that readers are challenged and tested in their ability to read the minds
of others. In Basic Elements of Narrative, David Herman (2009, 143–53)
explains the interconnection between narratives and qualia, stressing the
unique capacity of narratives to create “an environment in which versions
of what it was like to experience situations and events can be juxtaposed,
comparatively evaluated, and then factored into further accounts of the
world (or a world)” (151). In the same vein, Uri Margolin, who also touches upon the importance of qualia (2003, 286–87), considers literature as
“probably the most eloquent and differentiated non-scientific mode of
describing specific instances of the mind in action” (288).
Introduction
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For all these reasons, narrative texts and literary reading can be of special interest to cognitive theorists. Or to put it differently, if philosophers
and psychologists claim that our self and our mind are fundamentally the
product of narrativization, it would follow that a discipline with decades
of expertise in the theory and interpretation of narrative can contribute
to the understanding of narrative self-construction. The succession of
a narrative and a cognitive turn has made narrative theory into a privileged partner for other disciplines. It is the logical consequence of the
work of, for example, Jerome Bruner, Daniel Dennett, and Daniel Hutto.
Bruner, who states that “we organize our experience and our memory
of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative” (1991, 4), recognizes the expertise of literary theory in this respect (5). Commenting on
Hutto’s hypothesis about the narrative foundations of our thinking, Herman also makes this logical consequence explicit: “further work on the
nph [Narrative Practice Hypothesis] would itself stand to benefit from
a fuller integration of ideas developed by scholars of story” (2008, 512).
Narrative theory and literary studies in general can enrich the cognitive
study of artistic creations. They have a strong tradition of accounting for
linguistic deviation, semantic density, narrative complexity, and interpretive layeredness.
As this overview suggests, cognitive studies of minds and narrative
can indeed benefit from a strong awareness of the work done in literary
theory from Aristotle to Russian formalism, reception theory, readerresponse criticism, and so on. This is recognized and put into practice by
many scholars in the field—for example, by Peter Stockwell, who states in
his Cognitive Poetics that the old insights from literary theory are “useful
starting points” for a cognitive analysis that allows us “to conceptualise
things differently” (2002, 6). After the cognitive turn, familiar questions
(What is literature? Why do we read fiction?) can be conceptualized in
new ways, the reader’s consciousness can be theorized on various levels
(from intentionalist to neurological), and the evocation of fictional consciousness can be analyzed accordingly.
Threats and Opportunities of Cognitive Approaches
While we do not doubt the relevance of a cognitive approach, we should
not be blind to criticism that has been leveled against it. Possible threats
surfacing in comments on cognitive literary studies are its blindness to
10
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tradition, the potential backfire of eclecticism, a new essentialism based
on naive positivistic optimism, and a reductionist teleological thinking. First, for Meir Sternberg, who discusses the “cognitivist fortunes” at
length, blindness to the theoretical traditions we just sketched is one of
the reasons why interdisciplinarity after the cognitive turn has remained
largely unsuccessful (2003, 314). In the same vein, Marie-Laure Ryan
recently stressed that cognitive approaches to narrative often confirm what
narrative theory already knows. They are not yet able to be more precise
or to surprise narrative theorists with less obvious findings (2010, 471–2).
Second, cognitive approaches may become so eclectic that they lose the
quality of sharing a repertoire of terms and models, which is one of the
major benefits of cognitive studies. The benign image used by H. Porter
Abbott for cognitive literary studies is that of a group of pirates: “scholarpirates who plunder for their purposes troves of hypotheses, bright ideas,
and yes, rigorous scientific work” (2006, 714). The loot hauled in by these
pirates can be very diverse. In an essay on blending theory and narratology, Monika Fludernik observes that a lot of cognitive literary studies display this “strong eclecticism.” Scholars select a diversity of “perhaps not
compatible” cognitive tools to renew literary theory (2010, 3). For example,
prototype theory, schema theory, and blending theory (cf. Turner 1996;
Stockwell 2002) approach narrative phenomena in different ways because
they start from different accounts of cognitive representations and mental functioning. Arguably, the appropriateness of the model depends on
the task we are describing (e.g., building fictional spaces or understanding irony), but how do we decide which model is preferable?
Third, the cognitive turn threatens to elicit essentialist or reductionist thinking. Researchers might suggest that evolutionary or neurological
readings reveal the “essence” of literature—which may become reduced
to its cognitive dimension—or that ultimate explanations of literary texts
spring from these readings. We do not need postmodern ruminations to
show that in essentialist thought the interpretive potential of literature
is denied. In neurological and evolutionary theories of literature in particular, the belief that the new paradigm will be able to provide conclusive answers to a variety of age-old questions is striking. In this way, one
of the major benefits of cognitive approaches, namely, the promise of an
empirical basis (i.e., biological materialism), can become the instigator of
positivistic optimism. What is problematic is not the conviction that our
Introduction
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interpretations can be described as cognitive and neurological processes,
but rather the idea that these processes are the be-all and end-all.
We can find this type of reasoning, for example, in Brian Boyd’s version of literary Darwinism (a term he himself rejects), in which evolutionary criticism is presented as the solution to the mistakes made by
critical theory (2009, 384–92): “[Capital-T theory] has isolated literary
criticism from the rest of modern thought and alienated literary studies
even from literature itself. A biocultural or evolutionary approach to fiction can reverse these trends” (384). However, Boyd explicitly states that
evolutionary criticism “does not limit itself to scientific reduction” (390).
Even though his approach has a proclivity toward essentialism, it rejects
the kind of reductionism with which cognitive literary studies are sometimes associated.
What is sometimes overlooked is not so much the interpretive power
of literature but the extent to which observations and explanations are
based on interpretive acts. When literary Darwinists formulate literature’s
adaptive functions (see Carroll 2008, 119–28), they are interpreting the
features of literature and the meaning of literature within a constrained
explanatory framework and an a priori system of assumptions (e.g., that
literature has an adaptive function). In sum, different interpretations of
literature as adaption are put forward, but the interpretive act and the
ideology underlying these activities are not always acknowledged.
Finally, reductionism in cognitive approaches can take the shape of
speculative and teleological thinking. Alan Richardson (2004, 4), for
example, criticizes Turner’s propensity to stress continuities and universalities. In his approach to “the literary mind,” Turner does not do justice to cultural differences and to the specificity of literature and literary
reading. Richardson also notes that the empirical evidence for a lot of the
claims in cognitive literary studies is rather poor, a criticism that has been
seconded by David Miall (2006, 35–46). Teleological reasoning can be
found, for example, in straightforward Darwinistic underpinnings such
as Boyd’s claim that “our minds reflect evolution’s design” (2009, 25), as if
the evolution of mind is goal-oriented. As Richardson indicates, the generalizing claims of evolutionary literary studies are often speculative and,
until now, lack an empirical basis (2004, 13).
As we have suggested in the previous sections, the cognitive turn has
a lot to offer. The possibility of a dialogue across disciplinary boundaries
12
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and the promise of an empirical basis are of great value. What is more,
there seems to be an increasing awareness of the aforementioned risks,
and a lot of cognitive literary studies provide integrative models (e.g.,
Spolsky 1993; Herman 2002; Palmer 2004; Herman 2009). Rather than
turning away from structuralist narratology, cognitive narratologists such
as David Herman and Alan Palmer build on the insights from structuralism and combine them with cognitive studies. When Ellen Spolsky applies
cognitive theory to literary criticism in Gaps in Nature, she consistently
integrates ideas from a range of literary theories: New Criticism, deconstruction, poststructuralism, feminism, and so on. More recently, Spolsky (2002) demonstrates that both cognitive theory and poststructuralism
acknowledge the fuzziness of categories and the instability of meanings.
In that respect, Spolsky suggests, Darwin and Derrida are compatible. In
brief, these studies bridge the space between disciplines (cognitive sciences, literary studies) and between subdisciplines (structuralist narratology, poststructuralism, cognitive narratology).
An Outline of the Chapters
The same conviction that narratives thrive on gappiness underlies some of
the central questions of this book: How do gaps in our memory for texts
shape our comprehension of a given narrative? How does the stylistic
control of the reader’s attention create and remedy the gappiness of the
narrative? What makes us capable of filling the lacunae in visual representations, the portrayal of bodily experiences, or the figuring of fictional
minds? Why do we fill some of the empty spaces and ignore others? Why
do we pursue this gappiness and at the same time try to resolve it? New
cognitive research on narratives is brought together here to investigate
these and related questions, with a focus on the real mind of the reader
as well as the fictional minds of characters.
On the one hand, this collection brings together inquiries into fictional minds and the examination of the reader’s mind. On the other
hand, it stages a dialogue between the three orientations mentioned earlier on—the interpretive (hermeneutic), the empirical, and the cognitive.
Issues such as the gappiness of fictional minds and their transparency or
opacity are brought up, questioned, and examined in new ways (Mäkelä,
Sommer). Several aspects of the reader’s mind are explored in the essays,
ranging from the moral component of folk psychology (Keunen) to the
Introduction
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way the reader mobilizes his or her perceptual and bodily experiences
(Auyoung, Caracciolo, Kuzmičová). Several modules of processing, such
as memory (Bortolussi and Dixon) and attention (Emmott, Sanford, and
Alexander) are specified.
In the opening section of the book, authors who are well known for
the way they integrate narratology, stylistics, and empirical study present
new research. Two chapters in this section work in tandem, examining
two compatible concepts: memory and attention for narratives. In their
study of memory for the literary text, Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon first show that the extant research on this topic is far from extensive.
Neither literary theory nor psychology has produced in-depth studies of
the ways literature uses and tests the memory capacity of readers. Bortolussi and Dixon first map the research on the three levels of memory
representation distinguished by cognitive psychology and discourse analysis—namely, the surface structure, the semantic content, and the situation model. Next, they distinguish what is characteristic about memory
for literary texts. They introduce three blank spots in this domain, which
they term the surface-structure puzzle, the distal-coherence puzzle, and
the extended-text puzzle. In order to solve the first puzzle, they present the
results of their own experiments, which show the relatively poor quality
of the memory for the literary surface structure. In their conclusion, Bortolussi and Dixon discuss ways in which this research could and should
affect our teaching.
It can be said that our memory is sharpened when the literary text uses
stylistic devices to draw our attention. Catherine Emmott, Anthony J. Sanford, and Marc Alexander test the plausibility of this proposition, exploring how narrative texts can capture the reader’s attention through stylistic
and narratological devices. The authors conducted several experiments
within the framework of the stacs (Stylistics, Text Analysis, and Cognitive Science) Project in order to identify the rhetorical strategies that
control the reader’s attention. In their chapter, they summarize the work
in cognitive psychology and discourse analysis on such related issues as
attention, change blindness, depth of processing, and text change detection. The results of the recent stacs experiments reveal the wide variety
of textual strategies (e.g., mini-paragraphs, italics, cleft sentences, preannouncements) that can be used to draw the reader’s attention. The
authors’ narrative-continuation experiment shows how the attention
14
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of the reader is focused differently if scenario-dependent characters (as
opposed to principal characters) behave in unexpected ways. Finally, the
authors go into four distinct strategies characteristic of detective fiction.
Burying and revealing information, distractors, and false reconstructions
typically manipulate the reader’s attention in detective fiction, so that the
reader is efficiently guided from ignorance through suspicion to recognition and surprise.
In the third chapter of this section, Elaine Auyoung analyzes the paradoxical nature of reading. On the one hand, reading entails the ongoing combination of smaller units (sentences, words, even letters) into a
larger, more comprehensive whole. This process is often described as the
shift from surface information to in-depth processing. On the other hand,
readers are often confronted with partial—sometimes even minimal—
cues that nevertheless are sufficient to prompt recognition. Auyoung discusses this intriguing phenomenon by making recourse to both literary
and psychological theories. In her reading of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina,
two levels of inferencing are examined: the level on which characters decipher each other’s actions, and the level on which the reader of the novel
displays similar behavior. Auyoung shows that blanks need not be filled
in—contrary to what Ingarden assumed—and that themes and stylistic
devices often exploit this lack of definiteness. She links this tolerance for
gaps with our everyday way of coping with incomplete cues.
The second part of the book deals with readers’ experiences from a
philosophical viewpoint. Marco Caracciolo bridges the study of minds
and the study of narratives by integrating narratological and philosophical models. His central claim is that the consciousness the reader “finds”
in narrative texts is not represented or projected but enacted in the reader’s imagination. He takes issue with Fludernik’s conception of experientiality in narrative texts and proposes to lay more weight on the reader’s
consciousness. He takes his departure from Fludernik’s “experientiality”
as well as Herman’s focus on qualia. In the philosophy of mind, and more
specifically in “enactivist” research, Caracciolo finds the appropriate concepts to specify the reader’s mental engagement with the literary work.
According to enactivist theories, human experience amounts to an active
and embodied interaction with the world. When we are reading, experiences are simulated in our imagination. By implementing philosophical thought into literary theory and applying it to Saramago’s Blindness,
Introduction
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Caracciolo elucidates the implications of enactivism for the understanding of the reading experience.
The contribution by Anežka Kuzmičová ties in with Caracciolo’s enacted consciousness as she focuses on the “embodied mind of the reader.”
She starts from a phenomenological approach, which studies narrative as
a verbal presence (inducing the reader to experience things via descriptions) and as a direct presence (inducing the reader to experience, more
immersively, the imaginary world described). By elaborating on the second aspect, she tries to fill one of the gaps in narratology, namely, the relative lack of attention paid to the reader’s sensorimotor participation in
the imaginary storyworld. As a case study, Kuzmičová analyzes the sensorimotor details in Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Robbe-Grillet’s Jealousy.
She pays special attention to motor imagery and movement descriptions,
linking those narrative elements to the reader’s experience not only by
combining narratology with phenomenology but also by using findings
from experimental psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, and the history of reading. This enables her to draw some general conclusions about
the sensorimotor effects of narrative texts and to indicate some of the
problems that need to be tackled before this approach can really fill these
lacunae in narrative theory.
In linking narrative fiction with real minds and worlds one may downplay the literariness of fiction, and this may lead to “serious literary theoretical losses.” Maria Mäkelä wants to redirect the general cognitivist
attention to the specific literariness of texts and readerly responses to
them. She points to the dangers of reducing “literary experientiality” to
everyday experience and offers a way out of this impending reductionism.
Literary narratives evoke a sense of cognitive familiarity and estrangement. The familiar and the other are intertwined more closely and more
intricately in literary texts than in everyday life. They go together with a
multilayered narrative construction demanding “a multi-level cognitive
performance” that refuses the smooth “naturalization” of regular experientiality and that sets great store by uncertainty, unreliability, foregrounding, self-reflexiveness, and lack of closure. Mäkelä scrutinizes all these
aspects in two short stories by Richard Ford, showing that much can be
gained if one does not reduce literary constructions to familiar forms of
communicative (or informational) transmission.
The final section of the book puts some of the questions raised in the
16

Bernaerts, De Geest, Herman, & Vervaeck

Buy the Book

earlier chapters in a broader cultural and anthropological perspective. Roy
Sommer adds an important dimension to the understanding of interactions between the reader and the narrative text. In theorizing intercultural
aspects of reading, he draws our attention to the narrative gaps emerging from cultural difference and to our ways of filling them. In Sommer’s
exploration of these issues, cognitive, hermeneutic, stylistic, and empirical methods are nicely geared to one another. Cognitive concepts such as
“narrative empathy,” “inferencing,” and “categorization” are adopted in
an intercultural reading of Ajub Khan-Dhin’s play East Is East and Ben
Okri’s novel The Famished Road. Sommer’s interpretation of empathy in
East Is East shows how the interactions between the characters stage their
subjectivity and provide scaffolds for narrative empathy. In the last part
of the essay, Billy Clark’s method of sophisticated inferentialism is used
to analyze the way a group of students reads the opening of Ben Okri’s
intercultural novel. The students’ responses enable Sommer to distinguish
between several cognitive strategies for resolving intercultural gaps.
Bart Keunen places the reading mind in the broader frame of folk psychology, which tends to ascribe intentions to subjects and objects alike.
This is done not only to make sense of them but also to evaluate them in
terms of moral principles. In addition, this activity always involves the
construction and the influence of a specific social and cultural context.
Thus, the social-cultural context and moral heuristics are essential aspects
of our reading activity, whereas these two dimensions hardly come into
the purview of existing cognitive narrative studies. In order to accommodate these aspects of literary interpretation, Keunen develops a functional frame for narrative practices that avoids reductionism as it stresses
the literary nature of the discussed functions. He shows that literature
deals with “thick moral concepts” (complicated, multilayered concepts
such as loyalty and courage) rather than thin concepts such as “right”
and “wrong.” These thick moral concepts imply complex action models
and multilayered (“maximalist”) causality attributions. Modernist novels exhibit these narrative complexities, whereas myths and moralistic
stories tend to simpler forms of models and attributions. The functional
frame developed by Keunen not only fills a gap in the “narrative practice
hypothesis” of folk psychology theory but also enables us to distinguish
between various forms of narrativity and literariness.
This collection of essays provides the reader with fresh theoretical perIntroduction

17

Buy the Book

spectives as well as insightful literary analyses in the field of cognitive
narrative studies. As a whole, it also shows the tensions and the complementary nature of different methodological strands. Interpretive and
empirical research can and should join forces to improve our understanding of stories and minds. In addition, the volume reflects upon the nature
of literary narratives from the point of view of cognitive theory. Finally,
its chapters demonstrate that cognitive narrative studies offer added value
for general cognitive theory. In sum, we are convinced this volume helps
to fill gaps in theory and in reading, but we also hope it exposes new
explanatory lacunae worth filling in the future.
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Notes
1. Significantly, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory has a separate
entry on “gapping” (Spolsky 2005, 193–94; see also the entry on “indeterminacy” by Emma Kafalenos).
2. Since several surveys of cognitive literary studies have been published in
recent years, we are only briefly touching upon some developments here.
See, for example, Crane and Richardson (1999), Richardson (1999), Richardson and Steen (2002), Richardson (2004), Richardson and Steen (2002),
Herman (2010), and Zunshine (2010).

References
Abbott, H. Porter. 2006. “Cognitive Literary Studies: The ‘Second Generation.’”
Poetics Today 27 (4): 711–22.
Bortolussi, Marisa, and Peter Dixon. 2003. Psychonarratology: Foundations for
the Empirical Study of Literary Response. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Boyd, Brian. 2009. On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction.
Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
18

Bernaerts, De Geest, Herman, & Vervaeck

Buy the Book

Bruner, Jerome. 1991. “The Narrative Construction of Reality.” Critical Inquiry
18 (1): 1–21.
Carroll, Joseph. 2008. “An Evolutionary Paradigm for Literary Study.” Style 42
(2/3): 103–35.
Crane, Mary Thomas, and Alan Richardson. 1999. “Literary Study and
Cognitive Science: Toward a New Interdisciplinarity.” Mosaic 32 (2): 123–40.
Culler, Jonathan. 1975. Structuralist Poetics. London: Routledge.
Dennett, Daniel. 1991. Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin.
Fludernik, Monika. 1996. Towards a “Natural” Narratology. London: Routledge.
———. 2010. “Naturalizing the Unnatural: A View from Blending Theory.”
Journal of Literary Semantics 39 (1): 1–27.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1979. Truth and Method. London: Sheed and Ward.
Genette, Gérard. 1980. Narrative Discourse. Oxford: Blackwell.
Greimas, Algirdas Julien, and Joseph Courtès. 1976. “The Cognitive Dimension
of Narrative Discourse.” New Literary History 7 (3): 433–47.
Herman, David. 2002. Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
———. 2008. “Narrative and the Mind of Others.” Style 42 (4): 504–16.
———. 2009. Basic Elements of Narrative. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
———. 2010. “Narrative Theory after the Second Cognitive Revolution.”
In Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies, ed. Lisa Zunshine, 155–75.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Hogan, Patrick Colm. 2003. Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts: A Guide
for Humanists. London: Routledge.
Ingarden, Roman. 1973. The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation of the
Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Language. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press.
Iser, Wolfgang. 1972. “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach.”
New Literary History 3 (2): 279–99.
———. 1978. The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction
from Bunyan to Beckett. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Jauss, Hans Robert. 1970. Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der
Literaturwissenschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Johnson, B. S. 1964 [2004]. Albert Angelo. In B. S. Johnson Omnibus, 3–180.
London: Picador.
———. 1969 [1999]. The Unfortunates. London: Picador.
Margolin, Uri. 2003. “Cognitive Science, the Thinking Mind, and Literary
Narrative.” In Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, ed. David
Herman, 271–94. Stanford: csli.
Introduction

19

Buy the Book

Miall, David. 2006. Literary Reading: Empirical and Theoretical Studies. New
York: Peter Lang.
Palmer, Alan. 2004. Fictional Minds. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
———. 2009. “Attributions of Madness in Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love.” Style
43 (3): 291–308.
Richardson, Alan. 1999. “Cognitive Science and the Future of Literary Studies.”
Philosophy and Literature 23 (1): 157–73.
———. 2004. “Studies in Literature and Cognition: A Field Map.” In The Work
of Fiction: Cognition, Culture, and Complexity, ed. Alan Richardson and
Ellen Spolsky, 1–29. Burlington: Ashgate.
Richardson, Alan, and Francis Steen. 2002. “Literature and the Cognitive
Revolution: An Introduction” Poetics Today 23 (1): 1–8.
Ryan, Marie-Laure. 2010. “Narratology and Cognitive Science: A Problematic
Relation” Style 44 (4): 469–95.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1998. Hermeneutics and Criticism. And Other
Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Spolsky, Ellen. 1993. Gaps in Nature: Literary Interpretation and the Modular
Mind. New York: State University of New York Press.
———. 2002. “Darwin and Derrida: Cognitive Literary Theory as a Species of
Post-Structuralism.” Poetics Today 23 (1): 43–62.
———. 2005. “Gapping.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, ed.
David Herman, Manfred Jahn, and Marie-Laure Ryan, 193–94. London:
Routledge.
Sternberg, Meir. 1978. Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
———. 2003. “Universals of Narrative and Their Cognitivist Fortunes (I).”
Poetics Today 24 (2): 297–395.
Stockwell, Peter. 2002. Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction. London: Routledge.
Turner, Mark. 1996. The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zunshine, Lisa. 2006. Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
———. 2010. “Introduction: What Is Cognitive Cultural Studies.” In
Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies, ed. Lisa Zunshine, 1–33.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

20

Bernaerts, De Geest, Herman, & Vervaeck

Buy the Book

